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Alleyne: A Survey of Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1

X. TORTS
A. Failure To Give Written Notice Precludes a Dram Shop Claim
In Wallin v. Letourneau,' the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the licensee of a liquor establishment was not liable under
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.802, subdivision 1, (Civil
Damages Act) 2 because claimants did not substantially comply
with the written-notice requirement. 3 The plaintiff failed to give
written notice, and the defendant did not have actual notice of
the claim.4
Arlene and Michael Wallin sued Scott Letourneau 5 and
Leaders' Enterprises Inc. (Leaders), a liquor licensee, as a result
of severe injuries sustained by Arlene in an alcohol-related motor
vehicle accident.6 The Wallins alleged that the Hitchin' Post
Bar served Letourneau an alcoholic beverage while he was
obviously intoxicated and was therefore
7 responsible for injuries
the Wallins sustained in the accident.
The Wallins' attorney sent a certified notice-of-injury letter8
with the required statutory notice of Wallins' injury to The
Hitchin' Post Bar instead of to Leaders.9 The return receipt for
the letter was signed by a bartender, not an officer or authorized
agent of Leaders. As a result, no officer or authorized agent of
Leaders had received the letter."0
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Leaders' on the grounds that the Wallins' failed to give Leaders
written notice of their damage claim as required by Minnesota

1. 534 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 1995).
2. See id. at 713.
3. Id. at 714.
4. Id. at 715.
5. All claims against Letourneau were settled prior to trial. Id. at 713 n.1.
6. Id. at 713.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 714. The district court found that the letter contained sufficient facts,
if read, to reasonably put Leaders' Enterprises on notice of a possible claim and that
no other notice was sent. Id. at 714 n.4.
9. Id. at 714.
10. Id.
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Statutes section 340A.802 (Civil Damages Act)." In the alternative, the court found that the Wallins also failed to show by clear
and convincing evidence that Leaders had actual notice of their
damage claim.12 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed
recognizing that the Wallins did not strictly comply with the
written-notice requirement of the statute, but had complied
substantially with its requirements."
The Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's
decision.14 First, the court noted that the statute required a
party to give written notice to the liquor establishment within
120 days of the creation of the attorney-client relationship.1 5
To satisfy this, the Wallins were required to serve a notice-ofinjury letter upon a registered agent of Leaders, an officer of
Leaders, or the Secretary of State. 6 Because the Wallins did
not serve notice upon any of those people, they did not satisfy
7
the statute.'

11. Id. at 713 n.2 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 340A.802 (1992)). Minnesota Statutes
§ 340A.802 provides in relevant part:
Subdivision 1. Notice of Injury.
A person who claims damages and a person or insurer who claims contribution or indemnity from a licensed retailer of alcoholic beverages or municipal
liquor store for or because of an injury within the scope of section 340A.801

must give a written notice to the licensee or municipality stating: (1) the time
and date when and person to whom alcoholic beverages were sold or bartered;
(2) the name and address of the person or persons who were injured or whose
property was damaged; and (3) the approximate time and date, and the place
where the injury to person or property occurred .... An error or omission in
the notice does not void the notice's effect if the notice is otherwise valid
unless the error or omission is of a substantially material nature.
Subd. 2. Limitations; content.
In the case of a claim for damages, the notice must be served by the claimant's
attorney within 120 days of the date of entering an attorney-client relationship
with the person in regard to the claim .... No action for damages or for
contribution or indemnity may be maintained unless the notice has been
given ....

Actual notice of sufficient facts reasonably to put the licensee or

governing body of the municipality on notice of a possible claim complies with
the notice requirement.
MINN. STAT. § 340A802 (1992).

In 1993, Minnesota Statutes § 340A.802, subdivision 2, was amended to require the
claimant's attorney to provide the licensee with notice within 240 days after commencement of the attorney-client relationship. Act of May 24, 1993, ch. 347, § 22, 1993
Minnesota Laws 2450, 2466; see Wallin, 534 N.W.2d at 713-14 n.2. at 713-14 n.2.
12. Wallin, 534 N.W.2d at 714.
13. Id. (citing Wallin v. Letourneau, 524 N.W.2d 275,278 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 715.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Second, for the Wallins to have substantially complied, they
would have had to deliver notice to someone "reasonably likely
to give the notice to Leaders's Enterprises at the next opportunity." 18 Because there was no showing that the notice was deliv-

ered to such a person, the supreme court held that the Wallins
had not substantially complied with the statute.19
Third, the court rejected the argument that Leaders had
actual notice of the claim. The Wallins argued that the bartender not only accepted and signed for the letter, but had taken
similar action in a previous unrelated matter.2" Thus, the
Wallins argued that it could be inferred that the bartender acted
similarly on this occasion.2" The court, however, noted that the
bartender testified in a deposition that he did not remember
what he did with the letter.22 Therefore, the court held that it
cannot be inferred that Leaders received the notice or had
actual notice.2"
B.

Minnesota Statutes Section 466.03 Exempts Park and Recreation
Areas from Liability

In general, municipalities are liable for their torts.24 Yet in
Johnson v. Washington County,25 the Minnesota Supreme Court

held that Washington County was immune from liability
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6e, for
the wrongful death of Brandon Johnson.2 6 The court held that
the county was immune because its operation of an artificiallycreated swimming pond provided it with limited immunity.27
The father of seven-year-old Brandon Maurice Johnson
brought a wrongful death claim against South Washington
County School District and Washington County.2 8 Brandon's
death occurred after drowning in the Lake Elmo Park Reserve

18.
19.

Id.
Id.

20. Id. at 715-16. On one other occasion the bartender accepted and signed for
the notice and placed the letter in his supervisor's desk. Id.
21. See id. at 716.

22.

Id.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
MINN. STAT. § 466.02 (1994).
518 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 1994).
Id. at 596.
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 597.
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while on a school field trip. 29 The Reserve Pool was an artificially-created swimming pond consisting of a sloping sand
bottom that ranged from very shallow to six feet deep. The
water was murky one foot below the surface and the pool had no

depth markers."0 The school trip was planned and supervised
by four school district employees."1 A Washington County
district court found the school district and the county liable for
negligent operation and supervision. 2 The jury apportioned
liability at forty percent for the school district and sixty percent
for the county, with damages of $1,007,857.84." s The county
argued that it was immune from liability and if it were liable,
Minnesota Statutes section 466.04 limited its damages to
$200,000. 34 The district court refused to grant immunity
because the county had created a duty to protect those swimming in the Reserve Pool when it constructed an artificial
swimming pool and hired lifeguards.3 5 The court, however, did
limit the county's liability to $200,000.36
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding
the county immune from liability.3 7 The court of appeals relied
on Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6e, 3 which
provides a limited exception for park and recreation areas.39
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals
that the Reserve Park, including the artificially-created swimming

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 598.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Johnson v. Washington County, 506 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993)).
38. Minnesota Statutes § 499.03, subdivision 6e provides immunity for municipalities from the following:
[a]ny claim based upon the construction, operation, or maintenance of any
property owned or leased by the municipality that is intended or permitted to
be used as a park, as an open area for recreational purposes .... or from any
claim based on the clearing of land, removing of refuse, and creation of trails
or paths without artificial surfaces, if the claim arises from a loss incurred by
a user of park and recreational property or services. Nothing in this
subdivision limits the liability of a municipality for conduct that would entitle
a trespasser to damages against a private person.
MINN. STAT. § 466.03, subd. 6e (1992).
39. Johnson, 518 N.W.2d at 598.
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pond, was property intended or permitted to be used as a park
for recreation.' The county was, therefore, immune pursuant
to Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6e from the
entitle a
wrongful death claim unless its conduct "would
41
person."
private
a
against
trespasser to damages
To decide if a trespasser could recover, the court first
decided which trespasser standard applied. The court decided
that the general standard found in section 335 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts applied.42 This standard provides that
if a possessor of land knows trespassers constantly intrude, he or
she is liable for harm caused by an artificial condition if certain
requirements are met.4" First, the condition must be one the
possessor has created or maintains, is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury, and is of such a nature that trespassers will
not discover it." Second, the possessor must have failed to
exercise reasonable care to warn trespassers of the condition and
risk.4'
Applying this standard, the supreme court held that a
trespasser could not have recovered. The key factor was that the
pool, although artificially created, duplicated nature.' Thus,
the pool was not an artificial condition.47 In addition, even 4if
it were an artificial condition, there were no hidden dangers. 8
In general, the court noted that possessors of land are not
ordinarily liable for injuries occurring in ordinary, natural, or
artificial bodies of water free from traps or concealments. 49
The pool had a gradually-sloped bottom with no drop-offs or
unusual currents, so the court held that the county was immune
from liability.5 °

40. Id.
41. Id. at 599.
42. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 335 (1965)).
43. See Johnson, 518 N.W.2d at 599 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 335 (1965)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 599-600.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 600.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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C. DiscretionaryFunction Immunity-Policy-making Conduct
involving Social, Political or Economic Considerations
In Waste Recovery Cooperative v. County of Hennepin, 1 the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that neither the common-law
doctrine of official immunity, nor the statutory discretionary
function immunity protected the county from liability. The
county was sued for damages caused by an employee's erroneous
conclusion, based on his professional judgment, that telephone
books collected at depositories for recycling were "waste." 2
In 1990, the plaintiff, Waste Recovery Cooperative (WRC),
agreed with U.S. West to collect all of U.S. West's outdated,
surplus and defective phone books for recycling.5" U.S. West
customers were encouraged to deposit their old phone books in
containers provided at Target stores, where WRC would collect
them. 4 When Thomas Heenan, an employee of Hennepin's
Department of Environmental Management, learned of WRC's
recycling plan to convert the phone books to fuel, he informed
WRC that the books, in accordance with Ordinance 12, were
"waste." Consequently, the books were subject to county waste
designation requirements, because burning them would not
constitute recycling under Minnesota law.5" Heenan ordered
WRC to stop removing phone books from the county and to
return those already removed to the county incinerator by
February 28, 1991, or make arrangements acceptable to
Hennepin County for proper recycling of the phone books by
the same date.5 6 Hennepin informed WRC that they could
process the books for use as worm bedding and packing
material, but not fuel.57 Subsequently, WRC brought suit for
claims under state common law and the federal constitution
seeking a temporary restraining order and damages.58
The district court issued a declaratory judgment ruling that

51. 517 N.W.2d 329 (Minn. 1994).
52. Id. at 330-31.
53. Id. at 330. Testimony from Jeffrey Goodman, CEO of WRC, revealed that WRC
had planned to convert the phone books to fuel pellets and to shred them for use as
worm bedding and packing material. Id. at 330 n.4.
54. Id. at 330.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 330-31.
57. Id. at 331.
58. Id.
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pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 115A.03, subdivision 34,
the phone books were not waste and therefore not subject to
Ordinance 12." The district court reasoned that because the
phone books were not discarded as refuse, they did not come
within the definition of "solid waste" as defined by Minnesota
The district court
Statutes section 116.06, subdivision 10.'
further added that the phone books were exempted from
Ordinance 12 under Minnesota Statutes section 115A.83(1),
because they were materials that were separated from solid waste
and "recovered for reuse in their original form or for use in
manufacturing processes. " " The Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed.6 2
In July 1992, WRC petitioned the district court for damages. 63 In response, Hennepin County claimed governmental
immunity, which the district court rejected.6A On appeal, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Hennepin was entitled to
qualified immunity on WRC's federal claim and was also
protected by discretionary function immunity on the state law
claims.65
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review solely to
6 6 required
consider whether Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth
reversing the court of appeals' decision with regard to the claim
of discretionary function immunity.67 Under Nusbaum, the
crucial question is whether the conduct involved a weighing of

59. Id.
60. Id. Minnesota Statutes § 116.06, subdivision 10 (1990) defined "solid waste" to
include "discarded waste materials." The district court found the phone books had
been recovered for reuse, not discarded. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 422 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 1988). In Nusbaum, the court held that the critical
inquiry in the discretionary function immunity determination is whether the challenged
governmental conduct involved a balancing of policy objectives. Id. at 722. The court
also stated that governmental conduct is protected only where the state produces
evidence that the conduct was of a policy-making nature involving social, political, or
economic considerations. Id. at 720. Discretionary function immunity does not extend
to the exercise of professional or scientific judgment where such judgment does not
involve the balancing of policy objectives. Id. at 722.
67. Waste Recovery Coop., 517 N.W.2d at 331.
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policy objectives. 8
The court held that Hennepin was not entitled to discretionary immunity on the state law claims, and Hennepin employees
were not entitled to official immunity for the performance of
ministerial duties.6 9 The court explained that the decision to
consider the phone books "waste" did not involve any balancing
of policy considerations and therefore was not protected by
discretionary immunity.7" The court stated that challenging the
decision that the books were "waste" did not challenge waste
management policy or the balance between competing waste
management programs of recycling and waste designation.7 1
The county also argued that Heenan's determination was
covered by official immunity, and that Hennepin County was
thus vicariously immune.72 The doctrine of official immunity
protects public officials from liability for duties that involve the
exercise ofjudgment or discretion.7" The court held that it was
"clear" that the doctrine did not apply to Heenan, and thus the
county was not vicariously immune.
D. First Right-of-Refusal Statute ProhibitsPrearrangedSales to Third
Parties
The family farm foreclosure statute, found in Minnesota
Statutes section 500.24, protects family farmers whose land has
been foreclosed or similarly forfeited to creditors.75 The statute
enables family farmers to exercise a right of first refusal to
repurchase the land when the foreclosing agency attempts to sell
it.76 In Kesbo v. Ricks,77 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether the manner in which the defendants (Ricks and
Daniels) had exercised Valerie Ricks' right of first refusal
constituted wrongful interference with the plaintiffs (Kjesbo)
contract to purchase the farm from Metropolitan Life Insurance

68.
332.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.

Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 722 n.5; see also Waste Recovery Coop., 517 N.W.2d at
Waste Recovery Coop., 517 N.W.2d at 333.
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 500.24 (1994).
MINN. STAT. § 500.24, subd. 6(a) (1994).
517 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1994).
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Company (Met Life).7
The court affirmed the trial court
ruling granting summary judgment for Kjesbo on his tortious
interference claim and awarding specific performance relief.7"
Met Life had acquired the deed to the Ricks' farmland in
lieu of foreclosure.'
Kjesbo, who was then leasing the farmland, offered Met Life $165,000 for the property, which was
accepted subject to Valerie Ricks' statutory right of first of
refusal. 8 The Ricks, unable to meet Kjesbo's terms, sought the
assistance of Douglas Daniels to finance the purchase. Daniels
paid the financed amount directly to Met Life. Once the closing
was completed, Daniels owned half of the property.8 2
Kjesbo sued Daniels, Met Life, and the Ricks for violation of
the right-of-first-refusal statute and tortious interference with a
contract."3 The trial court ruled as a matter of law that Daniels
and the Ricks had wrongfully interfered with Kjesbo's contract
with Met Life and ordered specific performance.8 4 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was an issue
of fact as to whether the defendants had originally intended
Randy Ricks to own the farm. 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court ruling that defendants tortiously
86
interfered with Kjesbo's contract.
To prove wrongful interference with a contract, the plaintiff
must prove five elements: existence of a contract, alleged
wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract, intentional procurement

78. Id. at 588.
79. Id. at 591.
80. Id. at 587. In 1988 Met Life acquired title to approximately 320 acres of
farmland, taking a deed in lieu of foreclosure from the owner, defendant-respondent
Valerie Ricks. Id.
81. Id.

82. Id. At the closing Met Life conveyed title to the 320 acres to Valerie Ricks for
$165,000, and Daniels supplied the money. After receiving the deed, Valerie conveyed
half of the farmland to her son Randy, who then conveyed his half to Daniels. Valerie

kept the remaining half, which was mortgaged to Daniels to secure her promissory note
for $85,000. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court also ruled that Kjesbo was entitled to recover attorney fees from
Ricks and Daniels. Claims against Metropolitan Life were dismissed because Met Life
had given adequate notice to Valerie Ricks of her first refusal rights. Id. at 587-88.
Ricks and Daniels were also ordered to pay Met Life's attorney fees. Id. at 588.
85. See Kjesbo v. Ricks 506 N.W.2d 326, 330-31 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). The court
of appeals also ruled that neither Kjesbo nor Met Life were entitled to recover attorney
fees from defendants. Id. at 331.
86. Kjesbo, 517 N.W.2d at 591.
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of breach, without justification, and damages.8 7 The crucial
issue in this case is whether there was justification for procuring
a breach of the contract.'s
In deciding the issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court looked
to Minnesota Statutes section 500.24, subdivision 6(n), s9 which
prohibits the former owner from selling the farmland to a third
party if the sale arrangements were made and agreed to prior to
the former owner exercising her right of refusal.9' The court
held that the use of the conduit deed to Randy Ricks as the
straw-man was improper and impermissible under the statute.91
Although the parties used a strawman to technically comply with
the statute, the use of a strawman enabled a third party to
become an immediate owner of the farm. 2 Such a result was
directly contrary to the purpose of the statute.93 The court
reasoned that to allow a right of refusal to be so easily manipulated would frustrate the purpose of the law.94 Thus, the court
affirmed summaryjudgment in favor of the tortious interference
95
claim.

87. Id. at 588.
88. Id.
89. Id. Minnesota Statutes § 500.24, subdivision 6(n) (1994) states as follows:
An immediately preceding former owner, except a former owner who is
actively engaged in farming as defined in subdivision 2, paragraph (a), and
who agrees to remain actively engaged in farming on a portion of the
agricultural land or farm homestead for at least one year after accepting an
offer under this subdivision, may not sell agricultural land acquired by
accepting an offer under this subdivision if the arrangement of the sale was
negotiated or agreed to prior to the former owner accepting the offer under
this subdivision. A person who sells property in violation of this paragraph is
liable for damages plus reasonable attorney fees to a person who is damaged
by a sale in violation of this paragraph. There is a rebuttable presumption
that a sale by an immediately preceding former owner is in violation of this
paragraph if the sale takes place within 270 days of the former owner
accepting the offer under this subdivision. This paragraph does not apply to
a sale by an immediately preceding former owner to the owner's spouse, the
owner's parents, the owner's sisters and brothers, the owner's spouse's sisters
and brothers, or the owner's children.
MINN. STAT. § 500.24, subd. 6(n) (1994).

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id.
Kjesbo, 517 N.W.2d at 590-91.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id.

95.

Id. at 591.
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Owner Has No Duty Where Invitee Participatedin Creating
Dangerous Condition

In Baber v. Dill,96 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
whether a landowner has a duty to warn an invitee or make the
condition safe where an invitee has assisted in creating an
obvious dangerous condition. The court held that a landowner
has no such duty.97
William Baber sued Mike Dill for negligence in failing to
warn or repair a dangerous condition on Dill's property, and for
damages resulting from personal injuries sustained."
Baber
slipped, fell and was impaled on a steel reinforcing rod while
constructing a retaining wall on Dill's property. 9 The trial
court directed a verdict in Dill's favor, concluding that Baber's
actions constituted primary assumption of the risk because he
knew and appreciated the danger the rods posed, and that Dill
did not owe a duty to protect Baber from a perceivable risk.1"
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that facts were in dispute.1"' The Minnesota Supreme Court,
without addressing the issue of whether Baber had primarily
assumed the risk of harm that ultimately befell him,0 2 held
03
that Dill did not owe a duty to Baber1
First, the court considered whether the landowner has a
duty to the invitee. The court stated that the rule of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343A applied.1 1 4 Under
the Restatement, a possessor of land is not liable for physical
96. 531 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 1995).
97. Id. at 496.
98. Id. at 494-95.
99. Id. at 495. At the time of the injury, there were between four to seven
reinforcing rods protruding approximately 10 to 14 inches above the wall. Id. at 495.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court of appeals concluded that the issue of assumption of the risk was
a question for the jury. The issue of whether Dill had a duty to Baber was not
addressed. Id.
102. Id. The supreme court acknowledged that the doctrine of assumption of the
risk was not necessary in this case because before a court could consider assumption of
the risk, it first had to determine whether defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. Id.
103. Id. at 496. The supreme court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 343A(1) (1965), which reads, "A possessor of land is not liable to his invitee for
physical harm caused to them by activity or condition on the land whose danger is
known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965).
104. Baber, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495-96.
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harm if the condition is known or obvious, unless the
possessor
10 5
should anticipate the harm despite the obviousness.
Yet this duty is not absolute. The court concluded that a
landowner has no duty to an invitee to warn or make safe the
condition when the invitee assisted in creating the condition. 10 6
Thus, the landownner had no duty to warn the invitee. "To hold
a landowner has a duty to warn an invitee of danger created, in
0 7
part, by that individual is untenable."
Janice Alleyne

105.

Id.

106.
107.

Id. at 496.
Id.
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